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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MAUREEN MCGUIRE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appeal No. 920478-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Rule 
26(2)(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d)(1953 as amended), whereby the defendant in a circuit 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final order on a misdemeanor offense, whether it is a 
conviction or a plea. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain Appellant's 
conviction for Telephone Harassment? 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Salt Lake City Code § 11-08-030 
A. A person is guilty of Telephone Harassment if, with 
intent to annoy or alarm another, he/she: 
1. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a 
conversation ensues, without purpose or lawful 
communication, including but not limited to making a 
call or calls and then terminating the call before 
conversation ensues; or 
2. Makes repeated, unwanted telephone calls at 
extremely inconvenient hours; or 
3. Insults, taunts, or challenges another by use of 
telephone communication in a manner likely to provoke 
a violent or disorderly response; or 
4. Telephones another and knowingly makes any false 
statements concerning injury, death, disfigurement, 
indecent conduct or criminal conduct of the person 
telephones or any member of his/her family, or uses 
obscene, profane, or threatening language with intent 
to terrify, intimidate, harass or annoy. The making 
of a false statement as herein set out shall be prima 
facie evidence of intent to terrify, intimidate, 
harass or annoy. 
B. Telephone Harassment is a Class B. misdemeanor. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 7, 1992, Appellant was convicted, by the Honorable 
Michael L. Hutchings of Telephone Harassment, a Class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11-08-030 (T. 34). The court 
sentenced her to have no contact with the victim; attend an anger 
management course with proof to the court by 
November 1, 1992; attend mental health counseling with proof to the 
court by November 1, 1992; and 180 days in jail, 175 of which was 
suspended with the remaining 5 days to be completed by performing 
community in lieu of jail by November 1, 1992. This sentence was 
stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Peggy Sue Taylor Patterson, an acquaintance of Appellant's 
mother, testified that on December 28, 1991, at approximately 10:31 
p.m., the first in a series of harassing phone calls was received at 
her home (T. 1). This first phone call was answered by Mrs. 
Taylor's four-year-old daughter (T. 2,13). She did not talk to the 
person on the other end of the phone, but did talk to the individual 
when later calls were received (T. 3). 
A series of seven calls were received between 10:31 p.m. and 
11:53 p.m. December 28, 1991 (Addendum A Page 1). Mrs. Taylor 
contacted the police, and upon arriving at her home, allegedly heard 
a voice on the other end. The individual on the other end was not 
identified. These calls were received between 12:01 a.m. and 12:15 
a.m. on December 29, 1991 (T. 4-5). Recommendations from police 
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dispatch and the officer, to Mrs. Taylor consisted of keeping track 
of the calls made and the time they were received (T. 5-6). She 
kept track of these calls by writing the times calls were received 
and what was said (T. 6). This log was admitted at trial for the 
limited purpose that calls were received not for the identification 
of who made the calls (T. 6, Addendum A Page 1). 
Mrs. Taylor testified she knew the Appellant for two to three 
years (T. 7-8). She had never talked to the Appellant except for 
twelve brief conversations over the phone when she (Mrs. Taylor) 
attempted to call Appellant's mother (T. 9,10). This was over the 
course of two years and were two minutes in length at the most (T. 
11). The calls in question received by Mrs. Taylor on December 28 
and 29 of 1991, were much shorter in duration than earlier calls 
between Appellant and Mrs. Taylor (T. 12). Although the calls in 
question were much shorter in duration, Mrs. Taylor testified she 
felt it was Appellant's voice she heard on the other end of the 
phone, except for one call received at 12:01 p.m. December 29, 1991, 
which was from Lisa Larsen (T. 5,9,12). Even with Mrs. Taylor's 
alleged identification, she was not able to state how she knew this 
was Appellant's voice (T. 10). There was not one distinction or one 
characteristic that could be explained (T. 10). 
James Richard Butters, Mrs. Taylor's husband, testified that he 
was home when the calls were received (T. 13). He claimed the voice 
he heard when he answered the phone at 11:51 p.m. on December 28, 
1991, was the Appellant's (T. 14). Mr. Butters claimed to be a 
long-time friend of the family and has spoken to Appellant at least 
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ten times on the telephone over the course of twenty years (T. 15). 
When asked to describe any characteristics that would make 
Appellant's voice immediately identifiable, Mr. Butters could not 
name one (T. 16). 
Lisa Larson, Appellant's niece, testified that she made one 
phone call to Mrs. Taylor's home December 29, 1991 at approximately 
noon (T. 18-19, Addendum p.l). This call was made at the request of 
Appellant because Miss Larson knew the phone number, and because 
Appellant was upset because police officers were sent to her home by 
Mrs. Taylor the night before.(T. 17,22). 
Jamie Masterson, Appellant's fourteen-year-old daughter, 
testified that she was home with her cousin and Appellant December 
28, 1991 (T. 27). While she was playing with her cousin, she saw 
Appellant make one phone call which ended with Appellant singing 
into the phone (T. 28). That was the only phone call she saw 
Appellant make and Appellant was in the same room with Miss 
Masterson all night (T. 29). This call was made before police 
officers arrived at her home (T. 28-29). After the officers left, 
Miss Masterson and her cousin discussed the incident and ate some 
food (T. 29). During that period of time, there were no phone calls 
made by Appellant (T. 29). 
Appellant testified she made two phone calls between 10:30 p.m. 
and midnight December 28, 1991 (T. 21). These were calls to a 
friend who was not home, and after the answering machine came on, 
she sang a song into the phone (T. 21). Appellant admitted that on 
December 29, 1991, she asked Lisa Larson to make the one and only 
call to Mrs. Taylor (T. 22,25). 
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According to Appellant's testimony, she and Mrs. Taylor have 
talked on the phone twenty or twenty-four times (T. 24). Appellant 
also stated that she had not met Mr. Butters and had not had any 
telephone conversations with him (T. 25). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Contrary to the court's conclusion, there was no other 
evidence linking Appellant to the telephone calls except the one 
call made by Lisa Larson for Appellant. Prior familiarity with 
Appellant's voice was insufficient inasmuch as there were no 
particular characteristics that could be linked to Appellant's voice 
and there were no lengthy conversations between Appellant and Mrs. 
Taylor and Mr. Butters. Because there was insufficient evidence of 
Appellant's guilt, this court should reverse her conviction and bar 
her retrial. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
Appellant was convicted of Telephone Harassment, defined by 
Salt Lake City Code § 11-08-030 as follows: 
A. A person is guilty of Telephone Harassment if, with 
intent to annoy or alarm another, he/she: 
1. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a 
conversation ensues, without purpose or lawful 
communication, including but not limited to making a 
call or calls and then terminating the call before 
conversation ensues; or 
2. Makes repeated, unwanted telephone calls at 
extremely inconvenient hours; or 
3. Insults, taunts, or challenges another by use of 
telephone communication in a manner likely to provoke 
a violent or disorderly response; or 
4. Telephones another and knowingly makes any false 
statements concerning injury, death, disfigurement, 
indecent conduct or criminal conduct of the person 
telephones or any member of his/her family, or uses 
obscene, profane, or threatening language with intent 
to terrify, intimidate, harass or annoy. The making 
of a false statement as herein set out shall be prima 
facie evidence of intent to terrify, intimidate, 
harass or annoy. 
B. Telephone Harassment is a Class B. misdemeanor. 
Inasmuch as Appellant's case was tried to the bench, the 
standard of review discussed in State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315 (Utah 
App. 1987) applies. As this court explained in that opinion, 
"[I]f the findings, (or the trial court's verdict 
in a criminal case) are against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made, the findings (or verdict) 
will be set aside." [State v.3 Walker, 743 P.2d 
[191,] 193 [(Utah 1987)]. Application of this new 
standard does not eliminate the traditional 
deference afforded the factfinder to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses. 
Wright at 317. Review of the Court's assessment of the evidence in 
this case in light of the record of the trial must lead to the 
conclusion that the city failed to prove Appellant guilty of 
Telephone Harassment. 
The Court's ruling was as follows: 
After hearing the evidence in the case, I find the 
defendant guilty of the offense. I'm convinced of guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. I'm finding that the calls 
were made by the defendant. The witnesses that testified 
for the prosecution stated they could recognize the voice 
of the defendant. There has been some history between 
them of bad blood, bad feelings. I'm finding that they 
spoke on the phone on enough occasions to where they could 
identify the voice that was there. I'm also persuaded by 
the testimony of Miss Larson about the event that took 
place the next day. Again, a phone call was initiated by 
the defendant through the mechanism or means of having 
Miss Larson make the phone call. Now it is close enough 
in time and I'm finding that, and concluding I just don't 
have a reasonable doubt as to the identity of the person 
that made the phone calls. Clearly the phone calls were 
harassing and in violation of the city ordinance and for 
those reasons I find the defendant guilty of the offense. 
(T. 34-35). 
The trial court's assessment of the evidence was improper 
because the only consideration given to any of the evidence was a 
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call made the following day for Appellant, and the alleged 
conversations between Mrs. Taylor, Mr. Butters, and Appellant the 
night the calls were made. 
In rejecting Appellant's version of the circumstances 
surrounding the calls, the trial court discounted the credibility of 
the one witness who was with Appellant the night the calls were 
made, Jamie Masterson. Miss Masterson testified that she observed 
Appellant make a phone call after which Appellant sang into the 
phone (T. 28). After that point, she did not see Appellant make any 
other calls (T. 29). The fact that she is Appellant's daughter is a 
bias, but certainly not enough to lie about the number of phone 
calls that Appellant made. 
When voice identification is the only evidence presented, that 
identification alone cannot support a conviction unless there is 
shown (1) prior familiarity with the voice of the identified person 
or, (2) some peculiarity of the person's voice that makes it readily 
identifiable, State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (citing 
State v. Karas, 136 P. 788 (Utah 1913)). In the present case, 
Mrs. Taylor stated she had known Appellant for two to three years, 
but had only talked with her twelve times on the telephone (T. 10). 
Even then, the length of the conversation was no more than two 
minutes (T. 11). Although the length of the calls made was not 
determined, Mrs. Taylor also stated they were much shorter than two 
minutes (T.12). Mr. Butters also stated he had spoken with 
Appellant ten times over the course of twenty years (T.15). Twelve 
phone calls over the course of three years, which were no more than 
two minutes in length is not enough to develop familiarity with the 
voice of the identified person. 
Mrs. Taylor and Mr. Butters could not identify any 
characteristics of the voice heard on the phone (T. 10,16). Voice 
identification alone is considered insufficient to support a 
conviction unless shown to be especially reliable. State v. Karas, 
136 P. at 490. If there had been other evidence, even 
circumstantial, that would contribute to the voice identification it 
would provide a sufficient evidentiary basis to support the 
decision. In this case, there was no circumstantial evidence. See 
State v. Kilpatrick, 173 P.2d 284, at 285 (Utah 1946). There also 
were no clear facts to show identity and no personal identification 
by the caller. Clearly there were not enough evidence from which to 
draw an inference that Appellant was the caller. See State v. 
Nickles, 723 P.2d 123, 128-129 (Utah 1986). 
In resting Appellantfs conviction on the strength of the 
identification, the trial court ruled against the clear weight of 
the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Court's findings were against the clear weight of 
the evidence, this Court should reverse Appellant's conviction, 
declaring her innocent as a matter of law. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 
399, 403 (Utah 1980). 
Respectfully submitted this /* day of December, 1992. 
test'* ijb&-hu>M 
-10-
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, LESHIA LEE-DIXON, hereby certify that I have caused eight 
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